generating records annual report 2014

Ensuring Safety of Russian NPPs. Radiation Impact on Personnel and Citizens

Ensuring safety of Russian NPPs throughout their entire life cycle is the top priority of the Concern as an operator. The Concern sets forth new global safety standards.

SAFETY OF RUSSIAN NPPS: RESULTS OF INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In early 2014 ad hoc work group was created by the Council of the Federation Committee on Economic Policy following orders by Valentina Matvienko, Chairwoman of the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, to review matters of safety at operating nuclear plants of Russia.

Members of work group reviewed the materials submitted by nuclear enterprises and visited the Concern’s NPPs with reactors of various types: Novovoronezh NPP (VVER-1000), Leningrad NPP (RBMK-1000), and Beloyarsk NPP (BN-600).

ENSURING SAFETY OF NPPS

The inspection conducted by the Council of Federation brought the following results:

Strict compliance with all international and internal safety regulations.
Rostekhnadzor The Concern obtained licenses for the right of operation of all NPP power units. All power units are operated in accordance with the terms and condition of licenses. In 2014 there were no cases of suspension of licenses for operation of power units due to non-compliance with the terms and condition of licenses.
Insurance companies The Concern provided for 100% of insurance of all types of civil liability according to the requirements of the licenses obtained.
State regulatory agencies on safety The Concern’s employees involved in safety use of nuclear power duly undergone assessment of their knowledge of safety requirements and proper operating skills and received authorization to conduct relevant operations.

ALL NPPS OPERATING IN RUSSIA CURRENTLY COMPLY WITH RUSSIAN AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. ALL RUSSIAN PROJECTS IN THE AREA OF NPPS COMPLY WITH “POST-FUKUSHIMA STANDARDS”.

IN 2014 NPPS OF RUSSIA OPERATED SAFELY AND RELIABLY, UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIRED SAFETY LEVEL.

In 2014, the Concern registered the following events:

In all instances which required stop and unload of reactors, the availability of safety systems was complete and provided safe switching of reactors to sub-critical mode or to a required level of capacity.

Deviations at Operating Power Units of NPPs, Injuries, Unscheduled Automated Stops of Reactors, Fires (Fire Outbreaks)
NPP Deviations Unscheduled automatic
stops of reactor due to
critical state
Injuries
(amount)
Fires/fi re outbreaks
(amount)
2013 2014 2013 2014 2014/2013 2014/2013
Bal 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bel 2 1 0 0 1 0 0/1 0
Bil 2 0 1 0 0 0 1/0 0
Kln 5 5 1 3 1 0 0 0
Kol 6 4 2 1 0 0 0 0
Kur 7 9 1 1 0 0 1/0 0
Len 8 4 2 2 0 0 0 0
Nvo 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ros 4 4 0 1 0 0 0 0
Smo 4 4 2 1 0 0 0 0
Total 42 37 10 9 2 0 1/1 0

Deviations in operation of the Russian NPPs according to the INES scale between 2008 and 2014

Dynamic Development of Automatic Stops of Reactor from Critical Condition for Period from 2009 to 2014, Cumulative Numbers by Months

NPP SAFETY ASSURANCE CONTROL

Organization of NPP Safety Assurance Control

General Director of Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC
  • First Deputy General Director
  • Deputy General Director – Director for Production and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants
  • Chief engineers of operating NPPs
  • Production Control Subdivisions
  • Deputy General Director – General Inspector
    Deputy General Director – Director of the Facilities Construction Management Branch
  • Chief Inspectors of operating NPPs and NPPs under construction
    Chief Engineers of the Directorate of NPPs under construction
  • NPP Inspection Control Subdivisions
    Subdivisions for Technical Supervision of NPP Construction

INCREASING SAFETY AND STABILITY OF NPPS AGAINST EXTREME EXTERNAL IMPACTS

In connection with the events in Japan which caused the accident at NPP Fukushima, the Concern has developed and implemented an analysis of possible accident development scenarios at Russian NPPs, determining activities aimed at mitigating consequences and reducing impact on population and environment in case of a severe off-design accident (Plan of Activities Intended to Improve Safety of Operating NPPs and Activities Intended to Reduce Consequences of Severe Off-Design Accidents at NPPs).

Activities intended to improve stability of nuclear power plants against natural and man-made impacts are performed in three phases:

  1. Short-time (immediate) activities, 2011-2012. Aimed at reducing man-made risks. All NPPs were supplied with additional mobile accident-prevention machines. Completed.
  2. Mid-term activities, 2012-2014. Aimed at improving durability of NPPs. Preparation of design specifications and estimates, calculations, analyses, and feasibility studies, supply of additional equipment and materials according to design specifications. Completed..
  3. Long-term activities, 2012-2021. Implementation of additional design solutions at NPPs, adjustment of accident-prevention documentation. Currently are being inplemented.

Each year the Concern updates its activities according to the results achieved in the previous time period.

The activities aimed at enhancing stability against extreme external impacts for NPPs under construction, design, and at the stage of putting into operation are similar to the activities applied to operating NPPs. These activities include the following:

Activities at operating NPPs and NPPs under construction permits enhancing stability of NPPs against natural and man-made impacts, including:

Each year one of the Concern’s NPPs hosts Comprehensive Emergency Response Drills (CERD). In the course of the drill NPP personnel and subdivisions of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia jointly practice using all emergency response mobile machines available at NPPs.

In 2014 comprehensive emergency response drill were held at Kola NPP. CERD 2014 showed that the number and capacity of the available mobile machinery are sufficient to support a power unit in a stable and steady condition for the required amount of time in case of any natural or manmade anomalies.

Integrated emergency response exercises at NPP

FIRE SAFETY

In 2014, the Concern performed a number of activities to ensure fire safety, in particular:

THE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF FIRE FIGHTING ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH RECTIFICATION OF POINTS OF CRITICISMS INDICATED BY THE STATE FIRE SUPERVISION AUTHORITY IS 100%.

In order to increase fire safety at NPPs, in 2014 the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia allocated additional facility-based subdivisions of the Federal Fire Fighting Service involved in NPP protection intended to enhance fire protection and supplied fire-fighting machinery, including 19 fire fighting vehicles and 2 training facilities.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

The Concern pays great attention to industrial safety of NPP Hazardous Production Facilities (HPFs).

Pursuant to Federal Law No. 116-FZ dated July 21, 1997 “On Industrial Safety of Hazardous Production Facilities”, HPFs are registered with the departmental (industry-specific) section of state register of hazardous production facilities. As of December 31, 2014, 89 HPFs were registered with the departmental (industry-specific) section of state register of hazardous production facilities. All these HPFs are insured pursuant to the Federal Law “On Compulsory Civil Liability Insurance for Owners of a Hazardous Facility for Causing Harm as a Result of an Accident at the Hazardous Facility”.

Industrial Safety Declarations were prepared pursuant to regulatory requirements for hazardous production facilities of hazard classes 1 and 2. The Concern employees involved in operation of HPFs undergo training and certification on the matters of industrial safety in the appropriate committees of Rostekhnadzor and NPPs. Concern has the industrial safety management system in place in order to prevent industrial accidents and incidents as well as in order to plan and implement priority and long-term measures aimed at increasing industrial safety of hazardous production facilities and at providing due training for the Concern’s personnel making them ready to containment and elimination of consequences of accidents and incidents at HPFs.

In 2014, no industrial accidents at hazardous production facilities operated by Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC were registered.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

The most important objectives of the operating organization consist in providing for physical protection, including anti-terrorist stability of nuclear power plants which operate on all stages of their life cycles as nuclear hazardous facilities; protecting state, proprietary, and trade secrets; ensuring economic security of the enterprise while maintaining the Concern’s legitimacy and corporate interests.

Among the important elements of the physical protection system are organizational activities, actions of security teams, and sets of engineering and technical means of physical protection. Access control and management system (ACMS) is one of the nine sub-systems. It is an automatic analytical system capable to identify individuals and vehicles at the entrance to (and exit from) the protected areas using various physical identification characteristics; restriction on the number of people with the right to access the premises, buildings, and protected areas; automated activation and deactivation of security alarm for premises: control of time and place of entry, as well as the time periods during which controlled users stayed at the facility.

One of the ACMS objectives consists in making it impossible for anyone to bring weapons, explosive, narcotic, and radioactive substances (materials), and other prohibited items to NPP. For this purpose modern inspection and search equipment is implemented at NPPs (including by way of modernization). This equipment permits automating and speeding up the access of system users to the facility after their thorough search and identification. ACMS technical characteristics make it possible for subdivisions in charge of NPP security to timely detect, block, and apprehend violators and provide reliable access control for personnel, visitors, and vehicles to the facility and its protected areas.

EMERGENCY PLANNING AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The Concern has created and currently operates the emergency prevention and response system (SChSK). The system is used to plan, ensure preparedness, and conduct activities aimed at protecting personnel and areas of NPPs against emergency situations, both natural and man-made.

In structural terms, the Concern’s SChSK is a sub-system of the Industry-Specific Emergency Prevention and Response System of Rosatom State Corporation (OSChS) and is operated in liaison with regional and municipal subsystems of the Unified State System for Emergency Prevention and Response (RSChS) according to the location of nuclear power plants.

The particularity of the Concern’s emergency response system operation consists in a very efficient mechanism of cooperation in case of emergency. Appropriate resources and centralized reserves of finances and materials have been created at each NPP for containment and elimination of accidents and emergencies. Following the accident at Fukushima NPP all nuclear power plants were additionally equipped with mobile emergency units, newest systems were created for communication, public announcement, and information support. The availability of communication and public announcement systems is provided (24/7) by duty shift of the Crisis Center and operations control duty services (duty operators) of operating NPPs. The important place in the emergency response system belongs to the group for emergency assistance to nuclear power plants (EANPP) and coordinating bodies (committees on emergency prevention and elimination and fire safety) at operating NPPs. In the face of an emergency the group (EANPP) closely cooperates with technical support centers (TSC) created on the basis of the organizations which are general design contractors, chief designers, research advisors, as well as leading Russian institutions involved in matters of nuclear power industry. 14 TSCs are currently in operation. Each TSC has a 24/7 duty in place, and interaction with the Concern’s Crisis Center is also organized.

In 2014, the Crisis Center, nuclear power plants, and TSCs held emergency prevention drills at a regular basis to enhance coordination and interaction in the conditions of simulated severe accidents. Readiness checks were conducted at Kola and Leningrad NPPs to make sure they are prepared to contain and eliminate emergency situations, both natural and man-made. These NPPs confirmed their readiness to perform their tasks in the area of civil defense and emergency situations.

The Regional Crisis Center (RCC) was created and operated in 2014. It was established on the basis of the Concern’s Crisis Center (CC) following recommendation of the Post-Fukushima Committee and resolutions of the WANO workshop (Moscow Center) regarding meeting the requirements of the Rules for Information Exchange between Participants of RCC and NPPs with RU VVER of the WANO Moscow Center. Emergency centers of Russian NPPs interact with RCC within the same scope as with CC, and there is also an option to request support from other foreign RCC member countries.

The Concern’s emergency prevention and elimination system is a well-coordinated and interconnected system operating 24/7 and receiving information from NPPs in real time. The Crisis Center monitors main technology, radiation, environmental, and fire protection parameters 24 hours a day 7 days a week; the parameters are also submitted to Technical Support Centers thus creating unified information space for all participants of emergency response. The Concern’s current emergency prevention and elimination system meets all requirements set for the participants of the Unified State System for Emergency Prevention and Response, is one of its most sophisticated links, and corresponds to the best global practice.

SAFETY CULTURE

Safety culture is a basic principle of NPP safety management.

The Concern’s activity in the area of safety culture is aimed at forming a high level of commitment to safety among the Concern’s and NPP’s personnel.

High level of commitment to safety is shown in continuous improvement of activity that affects safety, self-consciousness of employees who understand their responsibility in the area of safety and their self-control during performance of all operations. All this together guarantees a steadily high level of NPP safety.

The Concern has developed and put into practice by an administrative order the Procedure for Organization of Work on Developing and Maintaining Safety Culture in Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC which sets forth distribution of functions on development and maintenance of safety culture within the company.

Management’s policy in the area of safe and reliable operation of NPPs is communicated to personnel using mass media, posters, and title screens on PCs. Also, Internet consulting portals are set up by management of operator companies, and awareness day campaigns are regularly held. The safety matters are discussed with NPP personnel during visits of the Concern’s management to NPPs and in the course of conference calls and visiting meetings of the Concern’s management.

The achieved level of safety culture and commitment of personnel to the principles of safety culture are evaluated systematically at all NPPs. Training materials on safety culture have been developed. The programs for preparation to a position and programs for maintaining personnel qualification include the “Safety Culture” section. Training on the subject “Psychological Aspects of Safety Culture” is organized on-site at NPPs.

Levels of Commitment to Safety Culture

  • Commitment
    at the political level
  • Commitment
    at the management level
  • Individual commitment
  • Declaration about policy in the area of safety
  • Management structure
  • Resources
  • Self-regulation
  • Determination of responsibility
  • Work practice determination and control
  • Personnel qualification and training
  • Incentives and penalties
  • Revisions, analytical reviews, and comparisons

  • Critical position
  • Strictly regulated and weighted approach
  • Communicative approach

“Safety Culture” and “Human Factor” booklets were prepared in order to use them in daily operations of NPP personnel. “Safety Culture” handbooks intended for better understanding of bases and principles of safety culture as well as for understanding the importance of human factor in safety matters were prepared and are currently in use. Instructional film on the subject “Self-Control as a Method to Prevent Errors of Personnel” was prepared and made available to NPPs in order to enhance training efficiency and prevent erroneous actions of personnel.

RADIATION EFFECT ON PERSONNEL AND POPULATION. RADIATION CONTROL

At the current stage of extended construction of nuclear power plants the important task consists in ensuring radiation safety of NPP personnel and local communities along with preventing radioactive contamination of the environment in excess of permissible levels regulated by radiation safety standards.

Information about radiation level at NPP, in the environment, and people exposure levels is obtained through radiation control. NPP design provides for radiation control system (RCS) intended to ensure efficient systematic and uninterrupted control of protective barrier integrity.

NPP radiation control system includes automated data measurement units and equipment that ensures their operation. The system obtains and processes data about controlled radiation parameters in the area of controlled access to NPP, at the industrial site, in the sanitary protective area, and in the supervised area in all operational modes of NPP, including designbased and off-design accidents, as well as about condition of NPP during decommissioning of power units.

Radiation control at NPP is exercised by NPP radiation control services certified in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology. NPP radiation control organization (scope, frequency, control points, performers, and result record-keeping) is determined by relevant rules approved by regional directorate of the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA) of Russia. Also, regional directorates of FMBA of Russia perform independent selective radiation control of environmental facilities and foodstuff produced locally.

Based on the radiation safety principles adopted by global community, Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC consistently conducts policy on implementation and further development of methodology on radiation protection optimization at NPPs. The methodology consists in maintaining individual exposure doses and number of exposed persons on the lowest possible levels taking into account economic and social factors.

The following measures are taken pursuant to requirements of standard documents at the Concern’s NPPs:

Information about exposure doses is recorded in personnel’s record cards for individual exposure doses and in the electronic databases of the automated system of individual dosimetry control (ASIDC) created in Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC.

Radiation control of the environment at the location of NPPs is exercised according to rules for radiation control taking into account the type of reactor units and particulars of their locations. The results are submitted in radiation hygienic data sheets of relevant organizations and annual reports about radiation environment at NPP locations. Radiation control is intended to confirm the absence of radiation impact of NPPs on population and environment by controlling and analyzing changes in radiation situation in the sanitary protection zone and supervised area at NPPs.

In order to ensure uninterrupted control over dosage intensity at the location of NPPs, automated radiation control system (ARCS) operates around each NPP. The system is a functional sub-system of the Unified State Automated System for Monitoring Radiation Situation on the territory of the Russian Federation. Its main purpose consists in controlling radiation in the sanitary protection zone and supervised area at NPPs and providing information and analytical support of emergency structures, NPP management, governing agencies and state authorities of various levels in case of an accident at NPP. ARCSs of all NPPs of Russia are connected through data transmission channels in an industry-wide sub-system whose central control panel is located in the Concern’s Crisis Center. From here, data are submitted to the industry-specific system of Rosatom State Corporation.

Kola NPP

Sliding (over Three Years) Collective Radiation Exposure at NPPs by Types of Reactor Units (Person-Sv/Unit)

Collective Radiation Exposure at NPPs in 2013-2014, Person-Sv/Unit

ARCS stands located in populated areas within the NPP supervised zone are equipped with information panel displaying data about dose intensity at the location. Radiation data is also available on the Concern’s website at http://www.russianatom.ru both in real-time mode and as archived data for previous periods.

Pursuant to Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 639 dated July 10, 2014 “On State Monitoring of Radiation in the Russian Federation”, organization and maintenance of a unified state automated system for radiation monitoring is stipulated, taking into account the efforts on creating ARCS of NPPs of Russia.

Thanks to focused organizational and technical efforts at NPPs, personnel’s radiation exposure is steadily decreasing.

From 1995 to 2014, the value of collective radiation exposures decreased by more than 3 times. The main limits of NPP personnel’s radiation exposures were not exceeded in 2014.

Sliding (over Three Years) Collective Radiation Exposure at NPPs by Types of Reactor Units (Person-Sv/Unit)

In 2014, a set of work was performed on evaluating personnel’s individual radiation risk and preparing techniques for radiation risk management. We worked on evaluating ratios of individual radiation risk for NPP personnel. The evaluation served as a basis for development of a software module for automated workstation which calculates individual radiation risk (ARMIR AES, version 6.1). The module permits making decisions on radiation risk management based on source data of personnel working at Russian NPPs. In 2014 we also worked on improving control over personnel’s internal radiation doses.

In 2014, the Concern established standards on emission limits and allowable discharges of radioactive substances into environment pursuant to Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 717 dated September 13, 2010 “On Amendments to Certain Resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation on the Matters of Authorities of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation, Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources, and Federal Service for the Supervision of Environment, Technology and Nuclear Management”.

No unauthorized discharge of radioactive nuclides took place in 2014. Like in the previous years, the actual gas-aerosol emissions and liquid discharges were significantly lower than the standards established by Rostekhnadzor.

The picture shows IRG emissions in percentage to the standards for allowable emissions. New (for some NPPs) and more “strict” standards for allowable emissions were introduced at NPPs in 2014. Furthermore, in 2014 the procedure for accounting of emissions changed. After such change radioactive substances are assumed to be present in emissions (even if they are not detected by current devices and methods) at the level of 0.5 of the minimum detectable amount, i.e. the emission evaluation became more conservative.

Kalinin NPP

The analysis of data on NPP emissions and discharges confirms the stable and reliable operating level of NPP power units and the efficiency of protective barriers created to prevent dissipation of radioactive substances.

Systematic measurement of concentration of radioactive substances in the atmosphere and heat sinks, measurement of soil and plant activity and food stuff at the control points located at a distance of 50 km from NPP confirm the absence of detectable impact of NPP operation on the condition of objects of outside environment.

NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Nonproliferation of nuclear materials is ensured through the Concern’s system of state accounting and control of nuclear materials. This system functions in full compliance with the requirements of international and Russian regulations and is under control of Rosatom State Corporation and Rostekhnadzor.

The system comprises a set of organizational activities, regulatory and procedural documents, and technical means which provide for accounting and control, detection and registration of losses, and prevention of unauthorized operations with nuclear fuel at all stages of its handling at NPPs, from receiving fresh nuclear fuel to sending spent nuclear fuel outside of NPPs. The system is based on timely registration of each reception, moving, or sending of nuclear fuel as well as changes in the amount of nuclear materials in nuclear fuel after its use in the reactor. All these operations are registered in operating and accounting documents of NPPs and serve as a basis for preparation of reports to be submitted to the system of state accounting and control of nuclear materials and Rosatom State Corporation.

Each year a physical inventory count of nuclear materials takes place in order to comply with the procedure for accounting and control of nuclear fuel at the places of storage and use of fuel assemblies (FAs). For the entire term of operation of the Concern’s NPPs there were no losses or theft of nuclear materials.

HANDLING RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

The main area of efforts in handling radioactive waste (RAW) is further reduction in generation of initial RAW and their transformation to a conditioned state which is safe for temporary storage at NPPs.

The Concern equips NPPs with RAW treatment facilities, reconstructs the existing and creates new storages for RAW at NPPs which provide for environmental safety of NPPs throughout the entire term of their operation. All work on extraction, treatment, and conditioning of collected and incoming RAW is performed at NPP in accordance with federal legislation.

The following techniques are used at NPPs for RAW treatment and conditioning: evaporation to the maximum salt, cementing, ion-selective cleansing, burning, fl attening, melting, and fragmentation. In 2014 at the expense of the Concern, the container storage and segmenting facility for spent FAs was put into industrial operation at the spent nuclear fuel storage facility of Leningrad NPP, and proper work criteria were achieved at the container storage and segmenting facility for spent FAs at the spent nuclear fuel storage facility of Kursk NPP in the industrial operation mode.

1957 t of metal waste contaminated with radioactive substances were removed from NPP sites (Balakovo, Beloyarsk, Kalinin, Kola, Novovoronezh, Kursk, Leningrad, and Smolensk NPPs). Initial registration of RAW generated before January 15, 2011 was completed (Kalinin, Kursk, Leningrad, and Rostov NPPs). First line of RAW treatment facility of Leningrad NPP was put into industrial operation.

DECOMMISSIONING OF NPP POWER UNITS

Decommissioning of NPP power units after the end of designed service life is a natural and necessary stage of their life cycle. This work was performed in 2014 in accordance with the activity programs for NPP decommissioning approved by Rosatom State Corporation as well as as a within the scope of the Federal Special Purpose Program “Ensuring Nuclear and Radiation Safety for 2008 and Until 2015”.

Amendments to the terms and conditions of the license of Rostekhnadzor authorizing operation of power units Nos. 1 and 2 of Beloyarsk NPP were received in order to perform the following operations: removal of the building of gas storage tank for accident containment, deconstruction of south-west structure of KhSO-1, disassembly of equipment, pipelines, and fi ttings of machine hall, etc.

Programs for comprehensive inspection of power units Nos. 1 and 2 of Leningrad NPP, No. 3 of Novovoronezh NPP were prepared. Programs for decommissioning of power units Nos. 1 and 2 of Kursk NPP were updated. Equipment was disassembled and 250 t of metallic low-level RAW was removed from power units Nos. 1 and 2 of Beloyarsk NPP. Operational testing of plasma treatment of RAW at power units Nos. 1 and 2 of Novovoronezh NPP started. Required routine operations intended to ensure safe condition of power units Nos. 1 and 2 of Beloyarsk and Novovoronezh NPPs were performed.